Just after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was brokered last August, some of the ‘celebrators’ of the ‘divine victory’ (never mind if they are staunch secular or hardcore leftists) presented a new thesis. “Lebanon of ‘post July 2006’ has become a way different from Lebanon of ‘pre July 2006’; and politics has to change in accordance with the new victory”, they claimed.
Their argument stresses that the discourse and narrative have to change to reflect this victory (never mind its ‘divine’ and ‘holy’ nature). But most importantly, a change in power has to occur. The pre 'July 2006' power-sharing mechanism where 14th of March coalition controls the majority in cabinet was rendered out-of-date with the new geopolitical developments – (never mind if the first to mention this was Bashar Assad of Syria). And a new cabinet has to be formed to include the victors (Hezbollah) and its allies (Michel Aoun, Suleiman Franjieh, Wiam Wahab etc.. to name a few).
But it seems that these ‘celebrators’ have either lost their ‘calendars’, lost their ‘binoculars’, lost their ‘logic’ …or lost them all.
They lost their ‘calendars’ forgetting that Lebanon of ‘post 14 February 2005’ is different from Lebanon of ‘pre 14 February 2005’. They forgot that what followed after killing Rafik Hariri including the UN resolutions, the Syrian withdrawal, the mass uprising, and the mobilisation of the Sunni community were not incidents to undermine or ridicule but events that have changed Lebanon’s politics.
They lost their ‘binoculars’ for not seeing beyond Lebanon’s coasts. Since the ceasefire last August, navies from European states have been monitoring the Lebanese seashore. Not only they cannot see the size of warships that are sailing few kilometres from the Lebanese shoreline but they fail to notice the international decision behind these ships; and that destabilisation of Lebanon would not be accepted.
Indeed, these ‘celebrators’ have lost some ‘logic’ or got a unique one. Their ‘logic’ does not see that developments in Lebanon are related to those in the region; their ‘logic’ believes that ‘Syrian’ interference was over the moment Syrian soldiers left Lebanon; their ‘logic’ still believes that ‘shouting’ and ‘ridiculing’ others brings popularity; their 'logic' thinks that it is easy to go back to pre 14 February 2005 situation...
A clash of logics is not necessarily bad; but it becomes risky when logics are asserted by force. And this is the logic of violence in civil wars.